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THE PRESSURE OF PRECEDENT: A
CRITIQUE OF THE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACHES TO STARE DECISIS
IN ABORTION CASES
Michael J. Gerhardt*
INTRODUCTION
The last thing one would have expected the Rehnquist Court to
do was to reaffirm Roe v. Wade.l After all, Presidents Reagan and
Bush had each campaigned in part on the ground that they would
appoint Justices who would overturn Roe,2 and the Justices they
appointed to replace five out of the original seven-member majority
in RoeJ wasted little time in trying to dismantle Roe. By 1989, in

* Associate Professor, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, The College of William and
Mary. B.A. 1978, Yale University; M.Sc. 1979, London School of Economics; J.D. 1982,
University of Chicago. I am grateful to Paul Marcus, Bill Treanor, Ron Wright and the
participants in the Boston University School of Law Faculty Workshop for their helpful comments on earlier drafts; and to Vanessa Elliott and Susan Korzick for their diligent research
assistance.
1. 410 u.s. 113 (1973).
2. See, e.g., E.J. Dionne, Jr. The Abortion Foes Hail Gains In Reagan Era, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 24, 1988, § 1, at 8, col. 1 (referring to President-elect Bush's "[p]residential campaign
promise to appoint judges who opposed abortions"); Gerald M. Boyd, Bush, in Iowa, Clarifies
Stand on Legal Abortions, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1987, § B, at 9, col. 1 (quoting then-VicePresident Bush as declaring on the campaign trail, "I oppose abortion, I oppose Federal
funding for abortion. [I] want to see the Roe v. Wade decision changed so that it won't
legalize abortion."); Stuart Taylor, Jr., Whoever Is Elected, Potential Is Great For Change in
High Court's Course, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1984, § 1, at 30, col. 1 (citing President Reagan's
endorsement of the Republican platform "call[ing] for [the] appointment of judges at all
levels who respect 'the sanctity of innocent human life' " and "will[ingness] to continue to
appoint Supreme Court and other Federal judges who share [his] commitment to judicial
restraint").
3. The original majority in Roe consisted of Chief Justice Burger and Justices Douglas,
Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Blackmun and Powell. See Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (cited in note I);
id. at 168 (Stewart, J., concurring); see also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 183-84, 207 (1973)
(Burger, C.J., concurring) (applicable to Roe and Doe, in which the Court struck down Georgia's statutes (1) criminalizing most abortions, except those certified by a physician as being
necessary to save the life or health of the mother and to prevent the birth of a child conceived
through a rape or with severe and irremediable mental or physical defects, and (2) requiring
all noncriminal abortions comply with nine conditions, including performance in a licensed
hospital); id. at 179 (Douglas, J., concurring) (applicable to Roe and Doe). The two dissenters in Roe were Justices White and Rehnquist. See note 5. President Ford appointed Justice
Stevens to replace Justice Douglas. President Reagan appointed Sandra Day O'Connor,
Antonin Scalia and Anthony Kennedy to replace Justices Stewart, Rehnquist and Powell,
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Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 4 all four of President Reagan's appointees to the Court-Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy-joined Justice Whites to weaken
Roe severely by broadening state authority to regulate abortions.
Moreover, the nomination and confirmation of Justice Thomas in
1991 seemed to ensure a pivotal vote for Roe's overruling: he had
publicly condemned Roe prior to his becoming a federal appellate
judge;6 and, once on the Court, he joined many of Justice Scalia's
calls for overruling various liberal precedents.? Justice Thomas also
authored his own invitations to overrule well-established lines of decisions applying the Eighth Amendment to confinement conditionss
and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to limit the
admission of hearsay evidence in criminal trials.9
respectively; and President Reagan appointed then-Justice Rehnquist to replace Chief Justice
Burger. President Bush appointed David Souter to replace Justice Brennan and Clarence
Thomas to replace Justice Marshall.
4. 492 u.s. 490 (1989).
5. Justice White and Justice Rehnquist dissented in Roe. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 171
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Doe, 410 U.S. at 221 (White, J., dissenting) (applicable to Roe and
Doe).
6. See, e.g., Clarence Thomas, Why Black Conservatives Should Look to Consen•ative
Policies, Speech to Heritage Foundation, June 18, 1987 (praising Lewis Lehrman's critique of
Roe and discussion of "the meaning of the right to life [a]s a splendid example of applying
natural law"); White House Working Group on the Family, The Family: Preserving
America's Future 12 (1986) (a report to which then-Chairman Thomas of the EEOC was a
signatory criticizing Roe and several other decisions as "fatally flawed" rulings that should be
"corrected" either by constitutional amendment or through the "appointment of new judges
and their confirmation in the Senate"); see also Clarence Thomas, The Higher Law Background of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 12 Harv. J.L. &
Pub. Pol. 63, 63 n.2 (1989) (after repeating the holdings of Roe and Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965), Thomas noted that he "elaborate[d] on my misgivings about activist
judicial use of the Ninth Amendment" in Clarence Thomas, Civil Rights as a Principle Versus
Civil Rights as an Interest, in David Boaz, ed., Assessing the Reagan Years 398-99 (Cato
Institute, 1988) (describing Griswold as a judicial "invention" and defending Robert Bork's
position that the Ninth Amendment and the Constitution do not authorize such judicial activism because it would give the Court a "blank check")).
7. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Judicial Activism: Justice Thomas Hits the Ground
Running, N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 1992, § 4, at 1, col. 4; Ruth Marcus, Early Returns Show
Justice Thomas As Advertised: Conservative, Washington Post, Mar. 1, 1992, at A6, col. 1.
8. See Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1004 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(joined only by Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas argued that the Eighth Amendment's ban on
cruel and unusual punishment did not protect prisoners from beatings by guards unless the
prisoners suffered serious injuries, and scolded the seven-member majority, including Chief
Justice Rehnquist, for adhering to precedents requiring reconsideration because they "cut the
Eighth Amendment loose from its historical moorings" by applying it to both punishment
and confinement conditions).
9. See White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736, 746 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the Court should have reexamined the Court's
Confrontation Clause precedents because "[t]he standards that the Court has developed to
implement its assumption that the Confrontation Clause limits admission of hearsay evidence
have no basis in the text of the Sixth Amendment" and that he "wr[o]te separately only to
suggest that our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence has evolved in a manner that is perhaps
inconsistent with the text and history of the Clause itself").
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Yet, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,10 the unexpected happened: a bare majority of the Rehnquist Court, surprisingly including Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter, expressly reaffirmed
Roe. Casey shattered the image of a monolithic mind-set among the
Reagan and Bush Justices favoring the overruling of various liberal
precedents, including Roe. Casey exposed deep-seated divisions
within the Rehnquist Court's conservatives both about whether the
Constitution protects the right to have an abortion and about the
role of precedent in constitutional decisionmaking. The decision revealed an even split among the Reagan and Bush Justices over
whether the legitimacy of the Court's decisionmaking depended
more on upholding liberal constitutional precedents to promote stability, certainty and predictability in constitutional law or on overruling such decisions to restore certain fundamental constitutional
values. Casey also severely undermined the conventional wisdom
that precedents rarely, if ever, constrain the Justices to make decisions they would prefer not to make.u
This essay analyzes the ramifications of Casey for understanding contemporary conservative Justices' views on the role of precedent in constitutional decisionmaking. . It evaluates not the
substantive merits of Casey but rather the relative strengths of the
different arguments regarding constitutional stare decisis put forward in Casey by the Reagan and Bush appointees to the Rehnquist
Court.
Drawing on a series of decisions culminating in Casey, Part I
examines the two conservative approaches to constitutional stare
decisis competing for dominance on the Rehnquist Court. Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter take a classically conservative approach (often the basis for criticizing the Warren Court)t2 that adherence to prior constitutional values breeds stability, certainty and
predictability in constitutional law; disrupts constitutional doctrine
as little as possible and only when necessary; and permits incremental decisionmaking building on the judgment of prior Justices and
the lessons of experience. In contrast, Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia and Thomas argue that overruling erroneously reasoned decisions will best preserve the legitimacy of the Court's decisionmaking, revive certain constitutional values and endure due to
10. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
11. See, e.g., Charles J. Cooper, Stare Decisis: Precedent and Principle in Constitutional
Adjudication, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 401, 402 (1988); James C. Rehnquist, Note, The Power That
Shall Be Vested in a Precedent: Stare Decisis, The Constitution, and The Supreme Court, 66
B.U. L. Rev. 345, 371-75 (1986).
12. See note 13.
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the strength of their reasoning and the probability of a solid conservative majority on the Court for the foreseeable future.
Part II critiques the two conflicting conservative approaches to
precedent in Casey. On the one hand, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy
and Souter failed to reconcile their express reaffirmation of Roe
with the full panoply of reasons for judicial fidelity to precedent and
with their decisions in Casey to overrule Roe's trimester framework
and parts of two other abortion rulings. On the other hand, the
Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Thomas underestimated the
degree to which their dissents in Casey seemingly rewarded political
forces bent on reshaping the Court. These three Justices also overestimated the likelihood that a decision to overrule Roe would preclude substantial instability in constitutional law: if they had
prevailed in Casey, their victory almost certainly would have provoked other presidents to appoint Justices who would resurrect Roe
and overrule as erroneously reasoned the decision overturning Roe.
Part II concludes that the Rehnquist-Scalia-Thomas approach is
less likely to dominate the Court than the O'Connor-Kennedy-Souter alternative. Despite any problems in its application the latter
approach tracks the overwhelming trend of Justices to overrule
precedents only if there are compelling reasons to do so, and strikes
a more reasonable balance between normative views of how the
Court should decide abortion-rights cases and the Court's need to
promote stability and continuity in constitutional law.
I

For years, conservatives have attacked the Warren Court for
abandoning the values normally associated with judicial fidelity to
precedent.I3 These values include the preservation of neutrality,
consistency, equality and stability in constitutional decisionmaking
and the legitimation of judicial review through the Court's acceptance of its own decisions as binding rules oflaw.I4 Yet, within the
past year and a half, the conservatives on the Rehnquist Court have
found themselves at odds over the degree to which they should adhere to precedents with whose reasoning or holdings they disagree.
13. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, The Tempting ofAmerica: The Political Seduction of the
Law 130, 348-49 (Free Press, 1990); Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment 344-46 (Harv. U. Press, 1977).; Philip B. Kurland,
Politics, the Constitution, and the Wa"en Court 37-38, 90-91 (U. Chi. Press, 1970).
14. See generally Arthur J. Goldberg, Equal Justice: The Warren Era of the Supreme
Court 15 (Nw. U. Press, 1971); Richard A. Wasserstrom, The Judicial Decision: Toward a
Theory ofLegal Jusitification 56-84 (Stanford U. Press, 1961); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role
of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 68, 70-71
(1991); Geoffrey R. Stone, Precedent, the Amendment Process, and Evolution in Constitutional
Doctrine, 11 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol. 67, 70 (1988).
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On at least three occasions, culminating in Casey, they have sharply
differed over whether respect for the Court and the legitimacy of its
decisionmaking depends more on their adhering to decisions of
which some of them disapprove for the sake of maintaining stability
and continuity in constitutional law or on their overruling such decisions and precipitating at least short-term disruption of constitutional law in the hope of firmly setting constitutional adjudication
back on the right track.
One such disagreement occurred on the last day of the 1990
Term in Harmelin v. Michigan.ts In Hannelin, the five-member
majority (consisting of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Souter) upheld Michigan's imposition of a life sentence without parole for drug possession, but split
over the necessity and the criteria for overruling Solem v. Helm.t6
In Solem, the Court had found that a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole for the commission of at least three
felonies violated the principle that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
imposition of a sentence that is disproportionate to the severity of a
crime. On behalf of himself and the Chief Justice, Justice Scalia
argued that Solem should be overruled because it was erroneously
reasoned, set forth an unworkable standard, and conflicted with the
original understanding of the Eighth Amendment and other case
law.11
But Justices O'Connor and Souter joined in Justice Kennedy's
separate concurrence rejecting Justice Scalia's arguments for overruling Solem. Instead, Justice Kennedy maintained that even
though Solem could have been better reasoned and could have articulated a more workable standard, the Court could remedy those
problems by narrowing but not overruling Solem.ts
A similar division among the Reagan and Bush appointees occurred near the end of the 1991 Term in Lee v. Weisman.t9 Lee
raised, inter alia, the issue whether the Court should have overruled
the besieged tripartite test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman 20 for
15. 111 s. Ct. 2680 (1991).
16. 463 u.s. 277 (1983).
17. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2686-2701.
18. Id. at 2702-05 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
In dissent, Justice White (joined by Justices Blackrnun and Stevens) found that neither the
history nor the case law regarding the Eighth Amendment supported Justice Scalia's conclusion that the Eighth Amendment contained no proportionality principle. As for Justice Kennedy's analysis, Justice White argued that it was "contradicted by the language of Solem itself
and by our other cases interpreting the Eighth Amendment." Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2709,
2714 (White, J., dissenting).
19. 112 s. Ct. 2649 (1992).
20. 403 u.s. 602 (1971).
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determining whether governmental actions violate the establishment clause.21 On behalf of the majority (consisting of himself and
Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter and Blackm.un), Justice Kennedy struck down a middle school graduation prayer on the
grounds of constitutional stare decisis. Rather than expanding on
his earlier criticism of the Lemon test,22 he explained that
the controlling precedents as they relate to prayer and religious
exercise in primary and secondary public schools compel the
holding here that the policy of the city of Providence is an unconstitutional one. We can decide the case without reconsidering
the general constitutional framework by which public schools'
efforts to accommodate religion are measured.23

Consequently, he declined to "accept the invitation of the petitioners and amicus the United States to reconsider our decision in
Lemon v. Kurtzman."24
In a separate concurrence joined by Justices' O'Connor and
Stevens, Justice Souter emphasized that "[h]ere, as elsewhere, we
should stick to [the settled law] absent some compelling reason to
discard it."2s He found that "on balance, history neither contradicts nor warrants reconsideration of the settled principle that the
Establishment Clause forbids support for religion in general no less
than support for one religion or some."26 He concluded that:
[w]hile we may be unable to know for certain what the Framers
meant by the Clause, we do know that, around the time of its
ratification, a respectable body of opinion supported a considerably broader reading than petitioners urge upon us. This consistency [of the evidence of the framers' and ratifiers' intent] with
textual considerations is enough to preclude fundamentally reexamining our settled law.27

In a dissent joined by the Chief Justice and Justices White and
Thomas, Justice Scalia rejected the majority's reliance on establishment clause precedents. First, he argued that the majority misread
those decisions, which he understood as turning on the incompati21. See Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2654 (describing Lemon's three-part test as requiring "a governmental practice [to] (1) reflect a clearly secular purpose; (2) have a primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) avoid excessive government entanglement with
religion").
22. See, e.g., Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 657 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
23. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2655.
24. ld.
25. Id. at 2668 (Souter, J., concurring)
26. ld. at 2670.
27. Id. at 2676.
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billty between prayer and the classroom setting "in which legal coercion to attend school . . . provides the ultimate backdrop" and
therefore raised "special concerns regarding state interference with
the liberty of parents to direct the religious upbringing of their children."2s Second, Justice Scalia urged abandoning the Court's "religion-clause jurisprudence" (particularly Lemon) because it "reli[ed]
on formulaic abstractions that are not derived from, but positively
conflict with, our long-accepted constitutional traditions [including
prayer at public school graduations]."29
Six days after the Court decided Lee, Casey gave rise to the
most strident disagreements yet over the degree of deference that
the Reagan and Bush Justices owed to a prominent liberal precedent, namely, Roe v. Wade. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter, joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, made a bare majority
to reaffirm the central abortion-rights holding of Roe. The three
swing Justices made a plurality to adopt a new "undue burden"
standard for measuring the validity of state abortion regulations.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia, joined by
Justice Thomas, would have overruled Roe and permitted state regulations and restrictions that are rationally related to a legitimate
state interest.
In an extensive discussion of the doctrine of stare decisis, the
majority initially acknowledged that, in reexamining precedents, the
Court balances competing interests: "its judgment is informed by a
series of prudential and pragmatic considerations designed to test
the consistency of overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the
rule of law, and to gauge the respective costs of reaffirming and
overruling a prior case."Jo It explained that these concerns led the
Court to:
ask whether the rule has proved to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability; whether the rule is subject to a kind of
reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences
of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation;
whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have
left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine;
or whether the facts have so changed or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or
28. Id. at 2684, 2685 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 2685.
30. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2808. Cf. Gerhardt, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 116-22 (cited in
note 14) (maintaining that the Court's review of its precedents typically consists of each
Justice's balancing of his or her views on how the Constitution should be interpreted and the
need to submerge those views for the sake of such social and institutional values as continuity
and stability in constitutional law).
·
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justification.3t

The opinion dealt briefly with the workability question, finding
that the determinations required under Roe "fall within judicial
competence,"Jz and turned to the more difficult issue of reliance.
"Since the classic case for weighing reliance heavily in favor of following the earlier rule occurs in the commercial context, [citing
Payne v. TennesseeJJ], where advance planning of great precision is
most obviously a necessity, it is no cause for surprise that some
would find no reliance worthy of consideration in support of
Roe."J4 "[C]ognizable reliance," however, goes beyond "specific instances of sexual activity."Js The majority explained that
for two decades of economic and social developments, people
have organized intimate relationships and made choices that define their views of themselves and their places in society, in reliance on the availability of abortion in the event that
contraception should fail. The ability of women to participate
equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been
facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives.36

The majority then considered Roe in the context of other decisions, finding its doctrine neither anomalous nor obsolete. And it
saw supervening developments in medical knowledge and technology as requiring no more than flexibility in the application of Roe's
central holding, rather than its overruling.J7
Recognizing that Roe is no ordinary precedent, the majority
broadened its discussion to consider arguable parallels with two
abandoned lines of cases, those identified with Lochner v. New
York Js and Plessy v. Ferguson.J9 It viewed the nullification of the
constitutional doctrines of liberty of contract and separate but equal
as resting on major changes in facts or understanding, beyond mere
changes in Court membership or disagreement with the original
holdings, that made reconsideration "not only justified but required."40 With Roe, the majority saw not just a threat to the
Court's legitimacy from too-frequent vacillation but an analogy to
31. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2808-09 (citations omitted).
32. Id. at 2809.
33. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991), overruling South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989)
and Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
34. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2809.
35. ld. at 2809.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 2809-11.
38. 198 u.s. 45 (1905).
39. 163 u.s. 537 (1896).
40. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2812.

1993]

STARE DECISIS AND ABORTION

75

Brown v. Board of Education 41 in that in both that case and in Roe
the Court had called on "the contending sides of a national controversy to end their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution."42 The majority explained that
[a] decision to overrule Roe's essential holding under the existing
circumstances would address error, if error there was, at the cost
of both profound and unnecessary damage to the Court's legitimacy, and to the Nation's commitment to the rule of law. It is
therefore imperative to adhere to the essence of Roe's original
decision[.]43

In an unprecedented move, Justice Souter expressed similar
sentiments in an oral statement from the bench after Justice
O'Connor had announced the Court's ruling in Casey. Echoing his
earlier concurrence in Lee, Justice Souter declared that, "To overrule [Roe] would subvert the Court's legitimacy beyond any reasonable question. If the Court were undermined, the country would
also be so."44 He agreed that "Roe has not proven unworkable in
practice."45
The partial dissents of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia, each joined by the other and by Justices White and Thomas,
would have found the overruling of Roe fully consistent with the
respect due to constitutional stare decisis. Both opinions strongly
emphasized the gravity of what they viewed as the error of Roe,46
and Justice Scalia likened the case to the dishonor of Dred Scott47
rather than to the abandonment of Lochner and Plessy.4s Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion contended that the prevailing opinion
abandoned rather than adhered to stare decisis. He pointed to its
modification of the Roe approach, including overrulings of Roe's
trimester framework49 and parts of two other decisions.so He disagreed point-by-point with its arguments on precedent and the plu41. 347 u.s. 483 (1954).
42. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2815.
43. Id. at 2816.
44. Jeanne Cummings, Supreme Court Upholds Most of Pennsylvania Abortion Law,
The Atlanta Journal and Constitution, June 29, 1992, § A, p. 1.
45. Id.
46. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2855 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part); and id. at 2875-76, 2882, 2884-85 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
47. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
48. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2883 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
49. Id. at 112 S. Ct. at 2817-18.
50. Id. at 2816 (overruling in part Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), •and City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983)).
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rality's reformulated "undue burden" standard.st He concluded
that
[s]trong and often misguided criticism of a decision should not
render the decision immune from reconsideration, lest a fetish for
legitimacy penalize freedom of expression. . . . The sum of the
joint opinion's labors in the name of stare decisis and "legitimacy" is this: Roe v. Wade stands as a sort of judicial Potemkin
Village, which may be pointed out to passers by as a monument
to the importance of adhering to precedent. But behind the
facade, an entirely new method of analysis, without any roots in
constitutional law, is imported to decide the constitutionality of
state laws regulating abortion. Neither stare decisis nor "legitimacy" [is] truly served by such an effort.s2

Both the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia challenged what the
majority characterized as the traditional rule of constitutional stare
decisis. Relying on his opinion in Payne, which had overruled two
Rehnquist Court decisions on the Eighth Amendment,sJ the Chief
Justice suggested that ultimately the standard is error, and, once
that is shown, then overruling is in order.s4 Justice Scalia strongly
agreed with the latter point but argued further that precedents must
give way when they conflict with the well established practices of
popular majorities, which had for years prior to Roe had the chance
to regulate abortions.ss
II

Neither the plurality's nor the dissent's approach to constitutional stare decisis in Casey is without problems. Both fail to consider fully the best arguments for, or implications of, their
respective positions.
For example, the Casey plurality-Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter, made two basic errors with respect to constitutional stare decisis. First, it failed to show why the arguments it
gave for reaffirming Roe's central holding did not conflict with its
joining the Chief Justice and Justices White, Scalia and Thomas in
overruling the trimester framework set forth in Roe as well as parts
of two other abortion decisions, in each of which the Burger Court
had expressly reaffirmed Roe.s6 The plurality's only explanation for
51. Id. at 2857-64.
52. I d. at 2866-67.
53. Payne, 111 S. Ct. 2597.
54. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2860-64 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
55. I d. at 2873-74 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
56. See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 772; Akron, 462 U.S. at 419-20.

1993]

STARE DECISIS AND ABORTION

77

the latter two overrulings was that
[t]o the extent [those two cases] find a constitutional violation
when the government requires, as it does here, the giving of
truthful, nonmisleading information about the nature of the
abortion procedure, the attendant health risks and those of childbirth, and the 'probable gestational age' of the fetus, those cases
are inconsistent with Roe's acknowledgement of an important interest in potential life, and are overruled.S7

Yet the plurality did not hesitate to join the Chief Justice and Justices White, Scalia and Thomas in following other precedents to uphold Pennsylvania's requirements for informed consent; a 24-hour
waiting period; and, for underage pregnant women, parental consent (with a judicial bypass).ss The plurality's selective disdain for
precedent undermined the credibility of its contentions that it was
not articulating a different standard from what Roe had set forth for
measuring the constitutionality of abortion laws and that case law
subsequent to Roe had not undermined Roe's workability and
coherence.
If the Casey plurality had in fact applied Justice Souter's principle that decisions should be overruled only if there are compelling
reasons to do so, it probably would not have overruled any aspects
of Roe and the other two abortion decisions. The mere identification of some potential inconsistencies between cases hardly qualifies
as a compelling reason for overruling. Justice Stevens showed in his
concurrence, for example, that even under the plurality's "undue
burden" standard, none of Pennsylvania's abortion regulations
should have passed constitutional muster.s9 Justice Blackmun similarly argued that Roe required subjecting abortion regulations to
strict scrutiny, under which none of the Pennsylvania abortion laws
would have been found to have been constitutional,60 and that ample precedent had already struck down state laws similar to the
Pennsylvania regulations upheld by the majority.6x
But by joining in overruling parts of three abortion cases, including Roe, the plurality clearly signaled that changes in the law
would follow from its application of the "undue burden" standard
and from its disagreement(s) with how previous Justices had applied. Roe to various abortion regulations. Casey preserved only
marginal certainty with regard to the constitutional law of abortion,
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2800.

See id. at 2832-33.
Id. at 2842-43 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 2845-54 (Blackrnun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 2850-54.
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because it raised doubts about which kinds of abortion laws (including those previously adjudicated) could now pass constitutional
muster under the "undue burden" standard.
The Casey plurality's second mistake was miscalculating the
nature of the reliance interests at work in Casey. Even though the
plurality had acknowledged that women rely on Roe in planning
their intimate relationships, it did so in light of what it regarded as
the basic rule of constitutional stare decisis announced in Payne (in
which the plurality had joined Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
White and Scalia) that "the classic case for weighing reliance heavily in favor of following the earlier rule occurs in the commercial
context ... where advance planning of great precision is most obviously a necessity."62
The Casey plurality erred, however, in imagining that the most
pertinent reliance interests involved in abortion cases occur prior to
conception and in assuming that concerns about reliance differ depending upon the kind of constitutional right. In fact, women do
not just count on Roe prior to engaging in sexual intercourse; they
also rely on Roe after they have become pregnant (many times
against their wishes), at which moment they face the not-theoretical
and often-difficult choice of whether to carry the pregnancy to term.
It is at this latter point that women have depended on Roe in over a
million cases a year because the Supreme Court has said that the
Constitution protects women's autonomy in making reproductive
choices.63 Nor should the Court easily abdicate its responsibility
for having made such reliance possible in the first place. Moreover,
the autonomy to make these choices without governmental regulation means at least as much (if not more) to women as the expectation of the Court's continued adherence to its property and contract
decisions means to commercial enterprises.
Finally, no Court prior to Payne had ever attempted to create a
distinction among civil liberties for purposes of stare decisis. The
idea that because commercial interests can arguably be defined
more precisely than personal, noneconomic ones, the former somehow require more respect than the latter for purposes of stare decisis, trivializes the degree to which the Court's noncommercial, civil
liberties decisions inalterably shape the ways in which many people
live and even die. As Justice Thomas ironically argued (and echoed
the Court's traditional practice) in his confirmation hearings, the
Court's standard for overruling precedents "should be as uniform as
62. Id. at 2809 (citing Payne).
63. See David Lauter, Decision Raises Question About "Undue Burden," L.A. Times,
June 30, 1992, at Al, col. 6 (referring to approximately 1.5 million abortions annually).

1993]

STARE DECISIS AND ABORTION

79

possible"64 and "the cases in the individual rights area deserve the
greatest protection."6s
The plurality's problems with precedent pale, however, in comparison with the magnitude of the four difficulties affecting Chief
Justice Rehnquist's and Justice Scalia's approach to constitutional
stare decisis. First, they both mischaracterized the Court's traditional position on stare decisis. The Chief Justice argued, for example, that the Court has generally followed the practice of overruling
precedents it has deemed to have been erroneously reasoned. 66 Citing his opinion in Payne, he argued that "[o]ver the past 21 years[,]
the Court has overruled in whole or in part 34 of its previous constitutional decisions."67 But a close reading indicates that perhaps as
few as five of the thirty-four opinions cited by the Chief Justice-all
five of which he had written himself-involved the Court's overruling of some prior decision(s) on the sole basis of the precedent having been reasoned badly.6s The remaining twenty-nine opinions,
including two authored by then-Justice Rehnquist, appear to
ground the overruling on the bases of erroneous reasoning and the
unworkability or outmoded nature of the overruled precedent or the
existence of subsequent, inconsistent case law. Thus, a more accurate restatement of the conventional practice regarding constitutional stare decisis came from Justice Souter, who argued in Lee69
and again (in his oral statement) in Casey7o that overrulings should
occur only when error and some other serious development(s) require it.
For his part, Justice Scalia argued in Payne, Lee and Casey that
the rule of stare decisis requires the Court to respect "longstanding
traditions of American society . . . proscrib[ing] [certain conduct.]"n But no member of the Court other than Justice Scalia has
ever recognized, much less endorsed, any similar rule of constitutional stare decisis. Indeed, if one were to follow Justice Scalia's
edict that "stare decisis ought to be applied even to the doctrine of
stare decisis,"n it is clear that no precedents (other than those
64. Ruth Marcus, Thomas Refuses to State View on Abortion Issue: Nominee Steadfast
amid Senators' Questions, Washington Post, Sept. 12, 1991, at AI, A4, col. 1.
65. ld. at A4, col. 5.
66. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2808.
67. ld. at 2863 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
68. See Gerhardt, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 112 (cited in note 14).
69. See Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2668.
70. See Cummings, The Atlanta Journal and Constitution (cited in note 44).
71. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2874 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
72. Id. at 2881.
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which he wrote) support Justice Scalia's approach to precedent.
Moreover, Justice Scalia conceded that enduring practices of
majorities do not deserve deference when they conflict with the
clear textual mandates of the Constitution, as he suggested was the
case in Loving v. Virginia, 73 in which the Court had struck down the
longstanding practice of many states to outlaw interracial marriages. 74 Yet, if the longevity or political popularity of certain practices do not insulate them from being struck down when they
conflict with the Constitution, then the question of their constitutionality does not tum on stare decisis but rather the clarity of the
constitutional text (and other legitimate sources of constitutional
decision).
.
Second, the Chief Justice's and Justice Scalia's preference for
overruling erroneously reasoned decisions is susceptible to attack
for being even more political in its origins and applications than the
majority's decision to reaffirm Roe. Justice Scalia tried to sidestep
the majority's charge that his vote to overrule Roe could be viewed
as being at least in part attributable to political pressure on the
Court:
[W]e have been subjected to what the Court calls 'political pressure' by both sides of this issue. Maybe today's decision not to
overrule Roe will be seen as buckling to pressure from that direction. Instead of engaging in the hopeless task of predicting public perception-a job not for lawyers but for political campaign
managers-the Justices should do what is legally right by asking
two questions: (1) Was Roe correctly decided? (2) Has Roe succeeded in producing a settled body of law? If the answer to both
questions is no, Roe should undoubtedly be overruled. "75

Yet Justice Scalia's response obscured the political implications
of the Casey dissents. He never commented on the striking coincidence that three of the four Justices urging the overruling of Roe
had been appointed by presidents who had expressly pledged in
their campaigns to appoint Justices who would do precisely that.
Justice Scalia also neglected to acknowledge that any weakening of
Roe strictly coincided with the arrivals on the Court of Presidents'
Reagan's and Bush's appointees. For example, each of the three
cases cited by the Chief Justice as showing that conflicts over Roe
had prevented majorities from forming in recent abortion cases did
so only as a direct result of the participation of these new Justices.76
73. 388 u.s. 1 (1967).
74. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2874 n.l.
75. Id. at 2884 (citations omitted).
76. See id. at 2858 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
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Nor did Justice Thomas's vote in his first abortion case to overrule
Roe surprise anyone who had read his pre-judicial writings and
speeches. 11
By being willing to go some distance from the expectations of
the presidents who appointed them, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy
and Souter reached more of· a semblance of neutrality than the
Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Thomas achieved. Unlike Justice Scalia, they heeded (at least partially) Justice Stewart's warning
that
[a] basic change in the law upon a ground no firmer than a
change in our membership invites the popular misconception
that this institution is little different from the two political
branches of the Government. No misconception could do more
lasting injury to this Court and to the system of law which it is
our abiding mission to serve.78
While a President unquestionably has the power to shift the direction of constitutional law through his judicial appointments, overrulings that are attributable solely to-and occur immediately
after-changes in the Court's composition leave the unmistakable
impression of politics rather than legal judgment guiding the Court.
In his partial concurrence, Justice Stevens underscored the fact
that it was only the Court's newer members who had made Roe's
overruling even a possibility: "[i]n the last nineteen years, fifteen
Justices have confronted the basic issue presented in Roe. Of those,
eleven have voted as the majority does today ... [Only] four-all of
whom happen to be on the Court today-have reached the opposite
conclusion. "79
Third, the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia's approach to constitutional stare decisis injects too much instability into constitutional
law. Even if the dissent had prevailed in Casey, it is likely that their
victory would have been short-lived. The appointment of Justices
bent on overturning such precedents as Roe produces further instability in constitutional law by encouraging the future appointments
of Justices who would try to undo decisions restricting abortion
rights and who would probably not have any more respect for conin part) (citing Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990); Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490
(1989)).
77. See generally Michael J. Gerhardt, Divided Justice: A Commentary on the Nomination and Confirmation of Justice Thomas, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 969, 981, 983, 986-87
(1992).
78. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant, 416 U.S. 600, 636 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting), cited at
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2814.
79. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2838 n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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stitutional stare decisis than the Casey dissenters. Such instability
ultimately fosters an image of constitutional law as being nothing
more than politics being carried on in a different forum.
Indeed, the plurality saw the dangerous potential in the instability brought about by the Chief Justice's and Justice Scalia's attitude about constitutional stare decisis:
There is, first, a point beyond which frequent overruling would
overtax the country's belief in the Court's good faith. . . . [T]here
is a limit to the amount of error that can plausibly be imputed to
prior courts. If that limit should be exceeded, disturbances of
prior rulings would be taken as evidence that justifiable reexamination of principle had given way to drives for particular results
in the short term. The legitimacy of the Court would fade with
the frequency of its vacillation. . . . [Second, when the Court
tries to resolve a particularly controversial constitutional conflict,] only the most convincing justification under accepted standards of precedent could suffice to demonstrate that a later
decision overruling the first was anything but a surrender to
political pressure, and an unjustified repudiation of the principle
on which the Court staked its authority in the first instance. So
to overrule under fire in the absence of the most compelling reason to reexamine a watershed decision would subvert the Court's
legitimacy beyond any serious question. "so

Fourth, the Chief Justice's and Justice Scalia's approach to
constitutional stare decisis casts serious doubt on the legitimacy of
judicial review itself.st Normally, the Court expects other branches
to comply with its exercises of judicial review (even to strike down
certain laws) as binding rules of law. The Casey dissenters' urge to
overrule Roe-or any precedent with a heated and repeated dissent
with which they agree-because it was wrongly decided shows that
they lack confidence in and prefer not to follow the Court's previously articulated rules of law on abortion (and many other subjects). The dissent's reasoning invites the states to ignore existing
rules of law in order to pass legislation to test the resiliency of any
decision with which the dissent disagrees, including Roe.
In his final dissent, Justice Marshall in Payne denounced such
invitations as fundamentally at odds with the rule of law. He chastised the majority for "invit[ing]" the states "to renew the very policies deemed unconstitutional in the hope that this Court may now
80. Id. at 2815.
81. In this regard, I refer to a strong version of judicial review under which the Court
expects the other branches to follow its lead, see, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958),
rather than a weaker form under which the Court might wait for the other branches to ask it
to resolve their disputes.
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reverse course, even if it has only recently reaffirmed the constitutional liberty in question. "82 As long as the states perceive that at
least three Justices are determined to overrule Roe in accordance
with the political will of the presidents who appointed them, it is
likely that political forces will continue to vie for control of the
power to appoint Supreme Court Justices.
Apart from the problems plaguing the Chief Justice's and Justice Scalia's statements on constitutional stare decisis, two other difficulties undermine Justice Scalia's position. First, Justice Scalia
showed disdain for the very majoritarian process he has so often
praised. In commenting on the degree to which the Casey majority's personal values rather than legal judgment dictated the outcome in the case, he suggested that one harmful byproduct was that
confirmation hearings for new Justices should deteriorate into
question-and-answer sessions in which Senators go through a list
of their constituents' most favored and disfavored alleged constitutional rights, and seek the nominee's commitment to support
or oppose them. Value judgments, after all, should be voted on,
not dictated; and if our Constitution has somehow accidentally
committed them to the Supreme Court, at least we can have a
sort of plebiscite each time a new nominee to that body is put
forward. "83

Justice Scalia's concern was clearly with the efforts of senators
trying to protect certain interests through judicial appointments
rather than the legislative process. Nevertheless, he overlooked the
well-established practice of the Senate to base confirmation decisions in part on the nominee's views regarding precedents and previously unrecognized rights.84 Senatorial advice and consent
remains a critical political (or majoritarian) check on the process of
selecting Supreme Court Justices. By vesting confirmation power in
an electorally accountable body, the Constitution makes it legitimate for the American people to share their concerns about the
Court's direction with their senators. Majoritarianism is also at
work in presidential elections, where the candidates-even in the
most recent contest between President Bush and then-Governor
Clintonss-often have promised certain kinds of Supreme Court appointments. While judicial nominees could refuse to answer ques82. Payne, Ill S. Ct. at 2619, 2621 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
83. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2885 (cited in note 10) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part).
84. See Gerhardt, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 975 (cited in note 77); see also Michael J.
Gerhardt, Interpreting Bork (Book Review), 75 Cornell L. Rev. 1358, 1387 (1990).
85. See, e.g., Ruth Marcus, At Issue: Abortion; On Support for Choice and Limits, BushClinton Contrasts Are Sharp, Washington Post, Aug. 16, 1992, at A21, col. 1.
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tions during presidential interviews or confirmation hearings about
which precedents they would like to perpetuate (as Justice Scalia
refused to do to the Senate's lasting consternation), the people's
preferences on which rights the Court should continue to protect is
a plainly relevant criterion for appointment to the Court. For example, if most Americans agree with the Supreme Court that there
is a fundamental right to choose to have an abortion but political
forces are working within the system to change the Court and to
take that freedom away, then the Constitution permits pro-choice
Americans to voice their concerns in the elections of presidents and
senators and in the confirmation process.
Second, Justice Scalia's argument that Roe should be overruled
because it is as morally repugnant as Dred Scott loses force in his
hands because he overuses it. Unquestionably, many people believe
in good faith that the strongest argument for overruling Roe is that
it is just like Dred Scott and Plessy in that it is so badly reasoned and
has produced such morally reprehensible consequences that it requires overruling as soon as possible. Yet, according to Justice
Scalia, the Court should overrule as erroneously reasoned and morally repugnant numerous precedents involving such varied subject
matters as the religion clauses, separation of powers, substantive
due process, proportionality of punishment, obscenity, criminal jury
selection, negative commerce clause, takings and affirmative action.s6 If as many decisions are as morally defective (or governed
by the personal values of other Justices) as Justice Scalia believes,
then it is a wonder the Court still retains any authority at all.
The problem may be less with most constitutional doctrine being morally repugnant and wrongly reasoned-the two seem to go
hand-in-hand in Justice Scalia's mind-than with Justice Scalia's
having a constitutional vision that is seriously at odds with the
moral tone of most twentieth century constitutional doctrine. In
the final analysis, the pressures of being a Justice on a collegial
court require someone with Justice Scalia's beliefs either to defend
more openly (or persuasively) the serious social upheaval his deviation from standard judicial practice would entail or to be more willing to follow the lead of most Justices to balance his normative
views on how the Constitution should be interpreted and the need
to submerge those views for the sake of such institutional or social
values as stability and continuity in constitutional decisionmaking.
86. See Gerhardt, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 122-23 nn.249-59 and accompanying text
(cited in note 14).
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CONCLUSION
The debate over Roe's future will hardly end with Casey. Roe's
fate depends on the composition of the Courts7 and on which approach to constitutional stare decisis continues to dominate the
Supreme Court.
.
On the one hand, the O'Connor-Kennedy-Souter position
holds that constitutional precedents should only be overruled if
there are compelling reasons to do so and if no other less disruptive
alternative is available. This approach has the advantage of ensuring a significant degree of stability and continuity in constitutional
law and promoting decisionmaking that builds incrementally on the
experiences of prior Justices. This approach is likely to prevail in
constitutional adjudication because it tracks the popular practice of
Supreme Court Justices to look for something more serious than
mere error as the basis for overruling precedents and exhibits a reasonable willingness to balance the competing interests at play whenever a landmark Supreme Court decision is being reconsidered.
On the other hand, the need to overrule precedents deemed
erroneous, as urged by the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and
Thomas, risks destroying the values associated with fidelity to precedent. Abandoning Roe (or any precedent for no better reason
than that a majority can show that it could have been better reasoned) violates traditional notions of neutrality, equality, consistency, stability, and efficiency in constitutional decisionmaking. In
addition, the Rehnquist-Scalia-Thomas approach raises serious
questions about the appropriate standards for overturning well-entrenched decisions and about the legitimacy of judicial review as
producing rules of law that can and should bind each branch of
government, including the Court.
Perhaps most importantly, a majority of the Court should continue to reject the Chief Justice's and Justice Scalia's approach to
constitutional stare decisis because it risks irreparable damage to the
Court's prestige and to constitutional law. Their approach has the
potential to increase politicization of the Court and instability in
constitutional law. For example, despite Justice Scalia's hopes to
the contrary,ss the Court's overruling of Roe would not end the
87. Cf. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2854-55 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("I am 83 years old. I cannot remain on this Court forever, and when I do step down,
the confirmation process for my successor well may focus on the issue before us today. That,
I regret, may be exactly where the choice between the two worlds will be made.").
88. In Webster, Justice Scalia explained his "compelling reasons" for overruling Roe:
"[We] can now look forward to at least another Term with carts full of mail from the public,
and streets full of demonstrators, urging us [to] follow the popular will •.. Of the four
courses we might have chosen today-to reaffirm Roe, to overrule it explicitly, to overrule it
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marches around the Court, because such a decision would positively
reinforce the uses of protest and political muscle to influence the
selection of Justices and the Court's position on abortion.
In addition, returning most, if not all, of the serious questions
about abortion to the state and federal political processes would not
end the controversy over the Court's role in protecting abortion
rights. Until a majority of the Court holds a firm position supporting Roe, the political conflict over Roe will persist rather than end.
Abandoning Roe at this juncture would make the Court's rulings on
abortion appear to be guided more by certain political choices
rather than responsible legal decisionmaking on the part of a majority of Justices. For as long as some Reagan and Bush appointees to
the Court seek the overruling of Roe in striking conformity with the
wishes of the presidents who appointed them, Roe's defenders and
abortion-rights advocates have little choice but to wonder that if
politics could undo Roe, perhaps politics can restore it.

sub silentio, or to avoid the question-the last is the least responsible." Webster, 492 U.S. at
535 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

